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According to recent statistics, almost half the globes population are Internet
users. The amount of network traffic generated by users interactions is increasing
dramatically. Extracting specific types of information from network traffic has its
applications in different fields in information security, especially the fields of digital
forensic and web penetration testing. Analyzing large amount of network traffic
for information extraction is considered challenging due to the different types of
protocols implemented by different web applications, and due to the application
of network traffic encryption.
In this work, different methods used for extracting different types of informa-
tion from network traffic were studied. It was found that existing solutions either
do not support newly adopted protocols on the web, or provide inaccurate results.
xi
A new network data mining tool was developed as part of this work, it is called
NetInfoMiner (Network Information Miner). It is capable of extracting four types
of information from network traffic with the support of different types of protocols
(HTTP, HTTPS, HTTP2, and SPDY). The current information extracted by Net-
InfoMiner are, users visited links, web credentials, session cookies, and common
Facebook activities (comment, like, post, etc). A new feature that enables the
logging of encryption keys into a key log file (KLF) on disk was investigated. This
feature is provided by highly popular browsers. This led to the proposal of a new
client side attack on TLS called DESSK (Decrypting Encrypted Sessions using
Stolen Keys) as part of this thesis. The attack exploits the key logging feature
through a prototype user-privileged malware called SSLKeyStealer. The malware
enables the feature and steals the KLF and possibly captures network traffic then
transmits these elements to a remote server. Later, the stolen elements can be
used in NetInfoMiner to extract the desired information.
The work in this thesis proves through the suggested DESSK attack that the
current implementation of the key logging feature by some browsers is not secure
since the KLF is not encrypted and can be acquired with user-level privilege (No
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مستخدمي اإلنترنت. كمية بيانات الشبكات الناتجة بينت إحصائيات جديدة ان نصف سكان الكرة األرضية تقريبا هم من 
عن تفاعالت المستخدمين تتزايد بشكل كبير. استخراج معلومات محددة من بيانات الشبكة له تطبيقات في العديد من 
مجاالت أمن المعلومات, خصوصا في مجال التحقيقات اإللكترونية و مجال فحص االختراقات في مواقع االنترنت. 
يات كبيرة من بيانات الشبكة الستخراج المعلومات يعتبر من المهمات الصعبة نظرا الختالف انواع تحليل كم
 البروتوكوالت المطبقة من مواقع االنترنت المختلفة, باإلضافة الى احتمالية ان تكون بيانات الشبكة مشفرة.
 
بيانات الشبكة. لوحظ وجود نقص في دعم في هذه الرسالة, تم دراسة طرق متعددة الستخراج معلومات مختلفة من 
بعض البروتوكوالت الجديدة و عدم دقة في نتائج الحلول الموجودة. تم تطوير أداة جديد الستخراج المعلومات من 
بيانات الشبكات كجزء من هذه الرسالة, هذه األداة قادرة على استخراج اربع انواع من المعلومات, و تدعم اربع انواع 
البرتوكوالت. المعلومات اللتي يمكن استخراجها حاليا باستخدام األداة هم, المواقع المزارة, و بيانات تسجيل مختلفة من 
الدخول )اسم المستخدم و كلمة المرور(, و ملفات تعريف االرتباط )كوكيز(, باإلضافة إلى بعض العمليات الشائعة 
 اخرى. على موقع الفيسبوك مثل التعليقات و اإلعجاب و عمليات 
 
كجزء من هذه الرسالة, تم دراسة ميزة جديدة متوفرة في بعض متصفحات االنترنت و منها ما هو مشهور جدا, توفر 
هذه الميزة امكانية تخزين مفاتيح التشفير على القرص. بناء على هذه الميزة تم اقتراح هجوم جديد على خصوصية 
جوم يقوم باستغالل ميزة تخزين ملفات التشفير عن طريق برمجية المستخدمين اللتي يوفرها بروتوكول التشفير. اله
خبيثة )مالوير( بصالحيات منخفضة. هذا المالوير حين التشغيل, يقوم بتفعيل ميزة تخزين مفاتيح التشفير و يقوم بسرقة 
بكة عند الضحية. الملف اللذي يحتوي هذه المفاتيح و ارسالها للطرف المهاجم, مع وجود امكانية لتسجيل بيانات الش
الحقا, يتم ادخال ملف مفاتيح التشفير و بيانات الشبكة المسجلة للضحية في أداة استخراج المعلومات. ما تم عمله في 
هذه الرسالة يثبت ان التطبيق الحالي لميزة تخزين ملفات التشفير ليس آمنا و بصالحيات منخفضة يمكن تحصيل ملف 
 ين.التشفير لكشف خصوصيات المستخدم
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Internet traffic carries tremendous amount of data, streaming, files, and many
other resources which can be intercepted by many parties. In particular, Internet
traffic contains sensitive information such as the sequence of the users’ visited
links which most users prefer to keep private, login credentials which is, by far,
the most commonly used access control mechanism used by web applications,
session cookies which, when captured, may allow to hijack sessions, and the high-
level activities performed in the social network giant ”Facebook” (comments, likes,
posts, etc.).
Traffic between a user and a web application (client and server) goes through a
sequence of hops, including corporate gateway, routers, Internet Service provider,
etc. Such setup involves a risk of eavesdropping and traffic analysis at each net-
work hop. Uncovering specific and sensitive information from the captured traffic
comes with three main challenges, namely, the huge amount of traffic, the increas-
ing complexity of the web, and most importantly, the use of encryption. Capturing
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traffic of even small local networks might generate a tremendous amount of pack-
ets. Traffic flowing through ISPs might reach 40GB per second [1]. Analysing
deeply such volume of data is beyond the capabilities of most parties.
The modern web is increasingly complex, using a variety of web technologies
involving highly dynamic content, extensive use of scripting languages, dynamic
visual effects, and browser plugins. Consequently, a single web page might gen-
erate a large number of requests due to the fetching of several objects, automatic
and continuous update of parts of the page, and advertisement content. These
requests will tend to use different and obfuscated parameter naming styles and
data formats. This makes the identification of specific data elements, buried in a
large number of packets, a truly challenging task. The major challenge, however,
is to extract useful data from encrypted traffic.
The main protection against such traffic analysis and mining attacks is to not
exchange data in plain-text. However, according to an implementation survey that
covers around 140,000 of the top web applications; the traffic of more than half of
the industry top web applications faces the risk of exposure due to insecure or non
existing implementation of encryption protocols [2]. For instance, while imdb.com
is ranked 58th on Alexa most visited websites [3], it only applies encryption in the
login page but not before or after, exposing users privacy (Movies and TV shows
preferences and others) to any traffic sniffing attack.
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1.1 Problem Statement
Extracting specific information from network traffic can be a tedious task. Ex-
isting techniques are either of limited functionality or work only with one type
of traffic, either encrypted or not. A solution to work with both types and also
provides sufficient summarizing and easy to deal with output report is needed. In
addition to that, the encrypted traffic will require the encryption keys for it to be
decrypted. So, a reliable method to get these keys is also required.
1.2 Motivation
Since 2016, Internet users have exceeded 3.3 billions [4], which directly affects
the amount of traffic generated from users’ interactions on the network level.
According to Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI), the amount of monthly data
transferred on IP networks will reach 168 Exabyte by 2019 [5]. These statistics
clearly justifies the validity of targeting network traffic for data mining, simply
because everything is captured on the network level. Also, information extraction
can benefit many applications. In digital forensic, any information might come
in handy in digital investigations, information like, visited sites, credentials, and
social networks activities. Also, in web penetration testing, the session cookies
are a key information required for pen testing, getting these specific cookies from
network traffic currently is not an easy and reliable option.
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1.3 Research Questions
The main research question is “What types of interesting information can be
extracted from this huge amount of data, and how to extract them”, also “If
the traffic is encrypted, are there reliable methods to decrypt the traffic”. For
example, if some party is interested in the login credentials of some client in a
website, the only desired information is the username and password. Number of
bytes in the traffic trace for the clients browsing session will most likely be in
megabytes if not gigabytes, where the login credentials are only few bytes for the
username and the password. So, how to get these few bytes out of the entire
gigabytes of traffic, and how to make the solution general to extract the desired
information from a large set of websites for large amount of users.
1.4 Scope
In this thesis, we are targeting the analysis of network traffic generated by four
protocols, HTTP, HTTPS, HTTP2, and SPDY. The targeted network traffic is
the one generated by direct browsing activities of Internet users, both plain and
encrypted. Regarding encrypted traffic, we are not targeting VPN traffic, TOR
traffic, or any encrypted traffic other than browser based SSL/TLS encrypted
traffic.
Also, our suggested attack and implemented tools, target computer devices
running Windows OS. Nevertheless, all implemented tools can be modified to
work with devices with Linux OS’s.
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1.5 Thesis Organization
The organization for the remainder of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2,
the required background for this work is provided. Beginning with a background
about the SSL/TLS protocols, the handshake and key negotiation process, a quick
overview for the concept of perfect forward secrecy and how it conflicts with the
key logging feature. Then, a small introduction regarding the different protocols
used in the WWW used for exchanging data. It also includes the prior works
done that have some similarities with the work done in this thesis. Finally, a brief
description of the tools used in this work is mentioned.
Chapter 3 presents the first contribution this thesis offers, a new attack against
user privacy called DESSK. The chapter discusses the attack model, attack ele-
ments, and the implementation of the attack.
In Chapter 4, the second contribution is presented, a network data mining tool
called NetInfoMiner. The chapter discusses the mining engines used for extracting
different types of information. The implementation of NetInfoMiner and its four
mining engines is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 5 presents the evaluation process followed in testing the different
elements in this work. It includes the results obtained by testing each mining
engine, in addition to some experiments conducted to test some special cases.
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion for the work, by summarizing the findings and
contributions. Also, we discuss the possible future work made possible after the





Data exchange between clients and servers in the World Wide Web (WWW) is
carried across many protocols, some of them provide encryption as a security
measure. Assuming that network traffic carries data which is exchanged using a
properly implemented encryption protocol, a successful traffic analysis and mining
attack requires the ability to decrypt past captured traffic, that is, after session
termination. In addition to understanding the underlying protocol used to carry
the plain traffic before encryption.
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2.1 Secure Sockets Layer SSL & Transport
Layer Security TLS
In this section, a brief background about SSL/TLS protocols is mentioned, in
addition to a brief summary of the handshake process and key negotiation. Finally,
the concept of perfect forward secrecy and its implementation contradictions is
also discussed.
2.1.1 Background
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transparent layer Security (TLS) are protocols
designed to protect both the integrity and the confidentiality of connections over
the network [6]. Initially SSL 2.0 was the first version released to public in 1995.
Quickly, in 1996 a complete re-design replaced SSL 2.0 into SSL 3.0 [7]. The
first version of TLS was released in 1999 based on SSL 3.0 (RFC 2246) [8]. Few
differences between TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0, the main one is that TLS 1.0 doesn’t
provide backward compatibility to some unsupported algorithms. In 2006 TLS
was updated to TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) [9], then 1.2 in 2008 (RFC 5246) [10].
2.1.2 Handshake and Key Negotiation
When a secure connection is required to be established (i.e. access an HTTPS
site), the client (usually a browser application) must perform a negotiation with
the server side (web application) to establish some security parameters that en-
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ables the creation of a secure connection. This negotiation is referred to as the
handshake process. Two sub-protocols are the essence of TLS, the handshake
and record protocols [10]. The handshake protocol handles the establishment of
common cryptographic parameters needed for encryption/decryption, in addition
to server authentication and possibly clients. The record protocol describes the
methods for dissecting the transferred data, applying encryption and then pack-
aging them into what is called records. This facilitates reversing the encryption
and presentation of data on the other end. [6]. A detailed description of the
handshake protocol is well presented in [6]. Mainly, the handshake process in-
cludes two methods for key negotiation, key exchange using RSA algorithm, or
key generation using Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm. In RSA, as shown in figure
2.1, the client generates a random string called ”pre-master secret”. It will be
used to generate the cryptographic keys used for encryption/decryption by both
sides. A crucial step is transferring that secret to the server without exposing it
to eavesdroppers. So, the client encrypts it with the public key of the server then
sends it. This step is meant to authenticate the sever, since only the desired server
holds the correct private key. The correct server decrypts the pre-master secret
and applies the agreed upon cryptographic algorithms to generate the symmetric
encryption key called ”master secret”. Then the master secret is used to derive
the session keys. The key point to remember regarding the RSA key exchange is
that the server private key can be used to calculate the session keys.
Differently in DH key generation method, the private key of the server is not
8
Figure 2.1: RSA key exchange method
needed in the generation of the session keys. The steps followed in the DH key
generation is shown in figure 2.2. Initially, the client generates some random
(ephemeral) DH components both private ones and public ones. Then, the client
sends the public components to the server. On the server side, the sever com-
ponents are generated and transmitted to the client. After both sides have the
required components, the master secret is calculated on both sides and used to
generate subsequent session keys.
Figure 2.2: Diffie-Hellman key generation method
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2.1.3 Perfect Forward Secrecy PFS
When an SSL/TLS session is created, both the client and the server are able to
encrypt/decrypt exchanged content using the established symmetric key (master
key or session key). Assuming that a party could capture encrypted network
traffic and the encryption key has been refreshed. Basically, SSL/TLS guarantees
that an attacker cannot decrypt past secure connection. This property is called
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and it means that previously negotiated session
keys cannot be recalculated from the client side after the session is terminated,
because it requires a random (ephemeral) string and other secret components that
no client is supposed to maintain. However, the private key of the server in some
cases can be used to recalculate the session key, that is the case if an RSA key
exchange method is used. If a Diffe-Hellman key generation method is used, the
servers private key is useless in decrypting SSL/TLS sessions since it is only used
to authenticate the server rather than encryption [6].
2.1.4 NSS and PEM Key Log Files
Conflicting with PFS, some browsers enable the use of ”Session Resumption” to
speed up the handshake process, this includes caching the negotiated SSL/TLS
session keys in the browser memory or even logging them on disk [11, 12]. Browsers
accounting for almost 73% of browsers market share [13], including Firefox,
Chrome, Opera, Torch, and other chromium based browsers can be forced to log
SSL/TLS session keys to an NSS formatted key log file (KLF) on disk if the envi-
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ronment variable SSLKEYLOGFILE is set. The NSS key log format is described
in details in [14]. Basically, each line in the KLF includes three columns, the first
one describes the key negotiation method (RSA or non-RSA). The second column
in case of RSA, holds the encoded encrypted pre-master secret, and the encoded
client random for non-RSA, as either one exists in the network traffic trace. The
second column is used by Wireshark to search the detected value in the network
traffic with the matching value in the KLF. If a match is found, Wireshark will
use the value in the third column which holds the pre-master secret (RSA) or the
master secret (non-RSA) to perform the decryption using the appropriate cipher
suite. This feature was meant to help analyzing encrypted SSL/TLS traffic on
the client side using Wireshark [6].
Similarly, Some digital certificate management systems provide the option for
system administrators to save the server’s private key into a known format called
PEM [15]. This key file format is also supported by Wireshark used to decrypt
TLS sessions established using RSA key exchange.
2.2 WWW Protocols
There are several networking protocols used to power up web applications on the
World Wide Web (WWW), the most common ones are HTTP, HTTPS, HTTP2
and SPDY.
Throughout this thesis, all the described algorithms and approaches share
some similarities between HTTP, HTTP2 and SPDY. So, for simplicity we refer
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to all of them as HTTP unless a distinguishing feature is needed.
A brief summary for each protocol is mentioned here:
• HTTP: The first version of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). An
ASCII protocol used to exchange content (pages, images, etc.) between
clients and servers. Although HTTP, specifically HTTP1.1 is still the most
common negotiated protocol for carrying web contents, it has suffered from
known limitations, such as head of line blocking, TCP handshake latency and
many other [16]. HTTP protocol consists of several methods and headers to
carry out its functionality. In this thesis we are interested in few of them. A
brief description of some of HTTP methods and headers is mentioned here:
– GET request method: an HTTP method for transmitting data from
the client to the server. The data is transmitted as a query string in
the body of the URL request (link), meaning, a request transmitted
using a GET method can be fully seen in the browser an is considered
”bookmark-able”.
– POST request method: same goal as GET method, but instead, the
data sent from the client to the server is not publicly shown in the link
and cannot be bookmark-ed by the browser. Convenient for transmit-
ting sensitive information such as passwords.
– HTTP Referer Header: a misspelling of referrer. It is a part of some
HTTP requests. It indicates the address (link) of the web resource that
initiated the request.
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– HTTP Full URI: similar to the referer header, but contains the full
address (link) of the requested resource. It includes the protocol name
(HTTP or HTTPS), the host domain (www.X.com), the full server
path to the resource (/server folder 1/server folder 2/.../page.php),
and the parameters sent to the resource which is called a query
string(key1=value1key2=value2...).
• HTTP2 & SPDY: Google initiated the SPDY protocol (pronounced speedy)
to improve both the security and the performance of HTTP. SPDY was the
basis of the second version of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP2).
There are minor differences between SPDY and HTTP2, but the main meth-
ods are the same. It is important to mention two features of SPDY/HTTP2:
(a) they are binary (while HTTP is textual); and (b) they multiplex sev-
eral requests and responses under a single TCP connection to reduce the
overhead on servers. Figure 2.3 from [17] clearly demonstrates the core dif-
ference between HTTP and HTTP2. In HTTP each request is followed by
its response, making the constructing of request/response pairs from net-
work traffic easier than HTTP2 were requests and responses are not paired
together. These features highly affect the processing of web transactions on
network traffic traces [16]. Processing SPDY and HTTP2 traces requires
different parsing and different concept than basic consecutive request and
response protocol. Also, and since these protocols are negotiated and not
fully supported by all browsers, traffic traces for retrieving the same web re-
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source might be different from one client to another. This effect is discussed
in Section (5.3.5).
• HTTPS: Any secure connection to a web resource can be served over
HTTPS, which is basically HTTP over SSL/TLS protocols.
Figure 2.3: The main difference between HTTP and HTTP2
2.3 Prior Work
The work in this thesis introduces a new attack on users privacy, by attacking
SSL/TLS. Also, network traffic analysis will be used to extract information about
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clients. So, we divided the related works into two main streams, works related to
extracting information from network traffic, and others related to different types
of SSL/TLS attacks.
2.3.1 Network Traffic Information Extraction
Extracting specific information from network traffic is a well known problem in
the traffic analysis field. Notable solutions in the literature target sessions [18] and
files [19] reconstruction. Other works focus on detecting malware downloads in the
traffic [20]. However, unlike this work, most of existing work target non-encrypted
HTTP traffic only.
ClickMiner [18] is a solution created for forensic reconstruction of user browsing
interactions from network traffic traces. It extracts the click path users followed
in their browsing by applying an improved referrer-based click inference (RCI)
approach initially introduced by Xie et al. [21]. Then, the extracted click path will
be fed to a browser driver that serves these clicks using only interactions recorded
in the traffic traces. NetworkMiner [19] is a commercial tool used to extract
information from network traffic. It extracts files (images, certificates, and other
types), HTTP parameters, cookies and many others. The free version of the tool
is of limited capabilities, it doesn’t support exporting results, or command line
execution for automating purposes. Although the professional version provides the
previous options, still, the extracted data is not effectively filtered. For instance,
the tool claims to extract the credentials, but it actually extract all the parameters
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of an HTTP request and displays them, even if these parameters hold other types
of information like language, location, etc. Vadrevu et al. propose AMICO [20],
a tool that targets live web traces for detecting malware downloads. AMICO
applies what is called a provenance classifier to distinguish a malware download
from a benign one based on network users downloading behaviour.
Another application for traffic analysis was proposed in [22] where the au-
thors claimed to successfully detect visits to criminal sites by monitoring the DNS
transactions recorded on network traces. The main idea behind their approach is
that suspicious sites will keep changing their hosting IP address. So, the authors
suggested that monitoring the relationships between the different FQDNs and the
IP addresses they are hosted on will lead to detecting criminal sites.
There are some existing work that targeted encrypted traffic for information
extraction. For example, in [23] since web browsers do not hide all information
about the encrypted traffic, for instance, HTTP object count and sizes are often
revealed. So, they claimed to successfully identify a significant fraction of a large
sample of web pages based on these unconcealed information. But, a big problem
with this approach, is that it can only identify static web content. Another work
done in [24] where the authors applied a statistical approach to fingerprint appli-
cation servers in an encrypted traffic. In their work, the authors suggested that
some features like the distributions of packet sizes and inter-arrival times when
fed to a machine learning classifier, can fingerprint the target server. Similar work
was performed in [25] where the authors were able to fingerprint encrypted traffic
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of two applications, SSH and Skype. The main idea is similar to [24] but using
larger and different set of features like the packets in forward and backward direc-
tion, forward and backward packet length, etc. Also, they tested their approach
using five machine learning algorithms and found that the C4.5 algorithm provides
the best results. Another work in the encrypted traffic analysis track, Miller et
al. [26] describe an attack on HTTPS aiming to identify web pages in top widely
used web applications with accuracy reaching 89%. Their attack applies cluster-
ing techniques to detect patterns in traffic. Then they apply a group of machine
learning techniques to determine similarities and detect known web pages.
The amount and quality of information extracted by analyzing the encrypted
traffic might not be enough in some cases, especially if some specific information
are required, like usernames, passwords, session related cookies and visited sites.
2.3.2 SSL/TLS Attacks
The availability of secure services, led people all around the world to start trusting
services providers with their most private contents and information (Photos, PIN
codes, SSNs, etc). Such direction led to more interest on attacking the privacy that
SSL/TLS protocols were intended to protect. A quick recall to the establishment
of SSL/TLS sessions. When an SSL/TLS session is created, both the client and
the server are able to encrypt/decrypt its content by applying the established
symmetric session key (master key). This session key in no way can be recalculated
from the client side after the session is terminated, because it requires a random
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string and other secret components that no client is supposed to maintain. On the
other hand, the private key of the server in some cases can be used to recalculate
the session key, that is the case if an RSA key exchange method was applied.
If a Diffe-Hellman key generation method was applied, the servers private key is
useless in decrypting TLS sessions since itis only used to authenticate the server
rather than encryption [6]. At last, in the establishment of an SSL/TLS session
the decision to either accept or reject the servers certificate is mostly left to the
client.
If attackers are interested in the content of an SSL/TLS session, they can
target either one of three possible points of attack. Either acquiring the clients
session key, or the servers private key or masquerading as the server by providing
a fake certificate to the client hoping for the clients acceptance. An existing
categorization of SSL/TLS attacks is discussed in [27]. We suggest a simpler
categorization approach. Sine an SSL/TLS session consists of three main elements,
a client, a server, and a connection between them. We suggest that attacks can
be categorized based on the three points of attack.
The first possible point of attack is the client. If an attacker was able to
acquire a session key for some pre-recorded SSL/TLS session, that session can
be decrypted. In this domain comes the attack we are proposing. Targeting the
extraction of session keys to decrypt TLS sessions is not a strange approach. Taub-
mann et al. [28] describe a solution called TLS key extractor (TLSkex) for decrypt-
ing and analyzing TLS traffic in order to detect malicious connections. TLSKex,
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records the network traffic of TLS sessions and simultaneously take a snapshot
of certain parts of the main memory that most likely holds the calculated session
key of an active TLS session. Their approach aims at extracting TLS master key
from the virtual machine’s main memory based on virtual machine introspection.
In DefCon 2016, J. Kambic [12] described a solution to extract SSL/TLS session
keys from memory dumps as artifacts in digital forensic to decrypt TLS sessions.
Both previous works are not used to attack the privacy of users but they attack
the privacy TLS provides. Our approach deviates from the two previously men-
tioned solutions by targeting the exported (KLF) from browsers rather than main
memory and by targeting remote hosts rather than local VM hosts or a physically
accessible machine.
The next possible point of attack is the server, by acquiring the servers private
key. This approach will not be helpful if the key exchange method provides perfect
forward secrecy, which is the case when ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key generation
method is performed. In contrast, this approach is helpful when RSA key exchange
is followed. This was claimed to be one of the methods N.S.A. carried to obtain
unrestricted access to otherwise private information [29].
Discussing the difference between the previous two approaches is an interesting
discussion to be made. A successful attack on the client side will expose sensitive
information of a single client when communicating with all application servers.
While a successful attack on an application server itself will expose sensitive in-
formation of all clients dealing with this server. Both client side and server side
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attacks can be considered as passive SSL/TLS attacks, although they require some
active steps to be performed initially, but after acquiring the necessary elements,
secure SSL/TLS sessions can be exposed long after the sessions were terminated.
This cannot be said regarding the third attack approach. The third family of at-
tacks are those targeting the connection between the clients and the servers, such
attacks are known as Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks. Such attacks require
attackers to be actively in the middle of the connection between the client and the
server. MITM attacks on TLS/SSL protocols vary by their attack nature, some
of them target the cryptographic aspect of the protocol like the BEAST attack
which targets a vulnerability in the CBC encryption mode, others take advan-
tage of some weaknesses in some protocol component, for instance, the CRIME
attack targets TLS compression to reveal some sensitive information such as ses-
sion tokens. Another example is the TIME attack which is based on the CRIME
attack model but depends on the time differences of a successful and a failed
guess to recover sensitive information. The latter group of MITM based attacks
are described with details in [30]. Another group of MITM attacks aim to divert
victims from accessing the secure HTTPS version of a certain web application to
its insecure HTTP version. This group of attacks is called downgrade attacks. An
example of such attack is HTTPS downgrade with ARP poisoning or JavaScript
[31]. It is important to mention that HTTPS downgrade attacks are not consid-
ered as attack on SSL/TLS itself, but they are used to bypass the privacy that
SSL/TLS offers. HTTPS downgrade attacks can be mitigated by the application
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of HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [32]. Recently (August 2016), re-
searchers from Microsoft reported an attack that exploits browser and operating
system web proxy configuration to steal user information [33]. The attack is cat-
egorized as MITM attack and requires the installation of a self-signed certificate
on the victims system. The attack is deployed over email by a malicious docx file.
Upon file execution, a Javascript code will launch a group of PowerShell scripts
to perform attack tasks such as snooping on HTTPS traffic. We investigated this
attack and found that it is only applicable on Windows Server 2012, Windows
Server 2012 R2, and Windows 8.1. We found also that to make it applicable for
previous versions in Windows, more higher privileged tasks are needed [34]. Our
attack model is applicable for all Windows versions that allow browsers to log
session keys, in addition to Unix-based OSes.
As seen above, a wide range of MITM attacks have been proposed against
SSL/TLS due to the fact that SSL/TLS protocols leave the option to either accept
or reject the servers certificate to the client, which is not an easy question to be
asked, especially to people with little information about the matter. An interesting
point of view regarding the security of TLS is discussed in [35]. The authors
discuss the browsers warning behavior and how it might affect users judgments
when asked for intervention in a real attack scenario. The authors claim that
browsers send the users large amount of warnings of low level risks that make the
users tend to overlook sensitive events simply because ”this happens a lot”.
In general, and due to the fact that MITM attacks require attackers not to only
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be involved in the connection between a client and a server, but also to perform
some active operations during the entire TLS sessions to be able to intercept and
decrypt the traffic passing through, these requirements limit the effectiveness of
such attack approach compared to the other two approaches. The first limitation
comes from the fact that MITM attacks in lots of cases can be detected and mit-
igated. A work performed in [36] where the authors presented a timing analysis
approach to detect MITM attacks, the approach was built on a hypothesis that
a successful MITM attack sometimes requires the generation of a fake certificate
which will be reflected into a noticeable time pattern in the TLS handshake stage,
a pattern not existent in a normal handshake. Also, in the same work, the au-
thors suggested ways to detect the presence of three famous MITM attack tools,
Ettercap, WebMiTM, and Cain & Abel. Each tool can be easily detected in a spe-
cific way relevant to its attack methodology. Similarly, known MITM attacks like
BEAST, CRIME and others where mitigated with miner upgrades and patches
[30], the same as the case of the DROWN attack, where it can be mitigated only
by disabling the support for SSL v2 and updating OpenSSL to a specific newer
version [37]. In addition to that, the requirement to be actively existent during
active TLS sessions is not always possible, for instance, if a security incident has
already happened and requires investigators to examine the encrypted traffic to
extract information or evidence, in such case an active approach is useless. The
last limitation can lead to describing MITM approach as Intrusive. MITM attacks
will most likely leave their marks on TLS sessions. Avoiding the intrusiveness fea-
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ture of any investigative approach is considered a main goal in the area of digital
forensics [38].
After understanding the limitations discussed above, targeting either end of
an encrypted channel might be considered a better approach. N.S.A. for instance
used to follow this approach by either hacking into clients and grabbing texts
before they were encrypted in many ways (keystrokes, malware, etc.) or forcing
servers to hand over their private keys and sometimes stealing them [29].
2.4 Tools
In this section we provide a brief description of the tools, scripting languages, and
programming languages needed to accomplish the work performed in this thesis.
1. Wireshark (v 2.2.1) [39]: the work performed in this thesis depends mainly
on the features provided by Wireshak . It was used to analyze the network
traffic of the different protocols; a crucial step prior to implementing the
mining engines.
2. tshark : the command-line tool of Wireshak. It was used as an interface
between the mining engines and the network traffic to decrypt then extract
the packets with possible desired information. It’s command-line nature
enabled the automation of the implemented tools.
3. editcap: a command-line tool from Wireshak. It is used to split large traffic
traces into smaller ones to avoid resources limitations.
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4. Windows Batch Scripting [40]: the executive component of the implemented
tools are all .bat files. Each file is responsible for initiating calls for tshark
and pre-process its output then providing the pre-processed results to the
mining engines.
5. PowerShell [41]: a tool from Windows used to automate tasks. The strong
string manipulation functions provided by PowerShell was needed to per-
form some pre-processing of some tshark outputs.
6. Dev-C++ (v 7.51.0) [42]: all the mining engines were developed in C pro-
gramming language using Dev-C++ IDE.
7. curl [43]: a command-line tool used to to initiate requests and receive re-
sponses for different protocol types, like HTTP, FTP, SMPT, and others. It
was needed in the implementation of the SSLKeyStealer malware.
8. RawCap [44]: a portable command-line tool for network traffic capture. It
was needed in the implementation of the SSLKeyStealer malware.
9. VirtualBox [45]: a virtualization tool from Oracle. The testing virtual ma-





This thesis proposes a new client side attack called DESSK (Decrypting Encrypted
Sessions using Stolen Keys), the attack exploits browsers feature that enables
SSL/TLS session keys logging. An attacker having the sessions key log file can
use it to retrieve plain-text data from SSL/TLS encrypted traffic. The traffic
can then be processed by our proposed traffic mining system to extract sensitive
pieces of information, in particular, the sequence visited URLs, login credentials,
session cookies, and common Facebook activities (comment, like, post, etc.). The
system uses heuristics to identify obfuscated credentials in various formats. It
then presents the data in a summarized and structured XML format. The DESSK
stealing feature has been implemented in a user-privilege malware (not requiring
administrator privilege) called SSLKeyStealer.
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Figure 3.1: DESSK Attack Model
3.1 Attack Model
The DESSK attack model is shown in Figure 3.1. Initially the attacker sends a
user-privilege malware called SSLKeyStealer to a target victim. The malware can
be delivered via E-mail, Drive-by download, etc. When launched, SSLKeyStealer
performs some tasks to collect the KLF and possibly the captured network traffic.
When received, the stolen KLF and the captured network traffic are passed to
our network traffic mining system, NetInfoMiner, which decrypts the encrypted
network traffic using the stolen session keys. NetInfoMiner depends on tshark,
the command-line tool provided by Wireshark, to perform the decryption.
NetInfoMiner can then extract the desired information, namely, the victim’s
visited links, login credentials, session cookies, and common Facebook activities.
More details about NetInfoMiner is discussed in 4. All previous extracted infor-
mation can be later used by the attacker to stage further attacks such as session
hijacking on the victim.
We identified two scenarios for DESSK attack: local victim scenario and re-
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mote victim scenario. In a local victim scenario, the attacker is either in the same
LAN as the victim or has access to the network traffic in the path from the victim
to the destination web servers (Corporate router, Gateway, ISP, etc.). In a remote
victim scenario, the attacker has no direct access with the victim nor to its net-
work traffic. In both scenarios, the victim must run SSLKeyStealer which requires
user privilege (no need for administrator privilege), and the remote network must
allow FTP or SMTP traffic, since SSLKeyStealer will use either one to transmit
the stolen elements. The only difference is the requirement to capture network
traffic. In the remote victim scenario, SSLKeyStealer is responsible for capturing
the traffic on the victim’s machine. This does not require higher privilege if a
network sniffer tool is already pre-installed (e.g. Wireshark [39], Tcpdump [46],
etc.). Otherwise, a privilege escalation becomes a must to use the companion
portable traffic capturing tool, namely, RawCap [44].
3.2 SSLKeyStealer
A key component in the DESSK attack is the SSLKeyStealer malware. When
launched, SSLKeyStealer performs the following tasks as shown in Figure 3.2:
1. Look for an environment variable called SSLKEYLOGFILE. Its value
should point to the KLF.
2. If there is no such environment variable, create it.
3. Close all the supported browsers (the ones that support the exporting of
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KLF).
4. If the attacker doesn’t have access to network traffic, SSLKeyStealer will
initiate network traffic capture.
5. On first launch of any supported browser, the KLF is created.
6. Create a scheduled task to periodically send the KLF as well as the traffic
capture to the attacker (FTP or SMTP).
Figure 3.2: SSLKeyStealer Flowchart
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3.3 Implementation
The prototype for the SSLKeyStealer malware is developed using windows batch
scripts. It consists of four main components:
1. Infection vector: responsible for the handling of the environment variable
SSLKEYLOGFILE and closing the supported browsers. Its functionality
can be acquired using commands in a .bat script.
2. Scheduler: responsible for the creation of a scheduled task on the client
side to periodically send the KLF and the captured network traffic. Its
functionality can be acquired by initiating commands to the local ”Task
Scheduler” in Windows, or its equivalent in Linux. It forces the OS to
create a task to launch the Transmitter script periodically.
3. Transmitter: responsible for the transmission of the stolen components to
a remote server. Its current supported protocols are FTP and SMTP. It
leverages the portable curl tool.
4. Sniffer: responsible for sniffing victims network traffic. If needed, the sniffer
will search the victims machine for an existing sniffing tool and leverage it
to sniff traffic. If no sniffing tool exists, the sniffer will initiate commands
to the companion RawCap sniffing tool. The later commands will require
the user to accept privilege escalation.
The current implementation of SSLKeyStealer works for Windows machines




Huge amounts of data is transferred by network traffic through different network
components. The rapid increase of Internet users make such data both available
and valuable. Since 2016, Internet users have exceeded 3.3 billions [4], which
directly affects the amount of traffic generated from users’ interactions on the
network level. According to Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI), the amount
of monthly data transferred on IP networks will reach 168 Exabyte by 2019 [5].
Part of this data includes private high-level information such as browsing history,
users’ credentials, session management cookies, and other information, which are
typically encoded in low-level format within the network traffic trace.
Extracting interesting information from network traffic is hard and tedious. It
requires understanding of all the protocols responsible for communicating informa-
tion over the network, and the criteria of generating the traffic. The process of ex-
tracting information becomes more challenging if the network traffic is encrypted.
According to a TLS implementation survey [2], about 53.6% of the industry top
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Figure 4.1: Visited Links Mining Engine
140,000 websites apply inadequate security implementation, which means either
insecure or absent implementation of TLS. This indicates that targeting both en-
crypted and non-encrypted network traffic for information extraction is equally
needed. In the work performed in this thesis, we developed a new tool called
NetInfoMiner. A tool for extracting some high-level information from network
traffic. The current information types targeted y the tool are the visited links,
login events (including usernames and passwords), session cookies, and common
Facebook activities (comments, likes, posts, etc.). The tool supports four proto-
cols (HTTP, HTTPS, HTTP2, and SPDY). It is designed to process large amount
of network traffic traces.
4.1 Visited Links Extraction
The first information NetInfoMiner targets for extraction is the visited links that
clients followed in their browsing sessions. The tool follows a referer-based click
inference (RCI) approach originally mentioned in [21]. To analyze encrypted
HTTPS traffic, with the additional support for HTTP2 and SPDY, a different
RCI is implemented by adding the idea of filtering known automatically gener-
ated advertisement requests mentioned in [18]. Figure 4.1 summarizes the new
RCI implementation. The original RCI approach claims that a visited link can
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be detected by matching a referer URI with a previously recorded request. The
tool extracts the visited links and group them logically in a new representation
suggested by us called a browsing session. Each browsing session includes a series
of visited links by a specific client using a specific browser without the client being
idle for more than a period of time τ . Links visited by the same client using a
different browser or after being idle for more than τ are represented in a different
browsing session. We observe that this representation helps understanding clients’
behavior better than a list of visited links.
4.2 Credentials Extraction
Figure 4.2: Credential Engine
The credentials information extractor is in charge of retrieving web applica-
tions credentials (usernames and passwords). The two main challenges for cre-
dentials information extraction are the large amount of traffic to be analyzed and
the variety of ways web applications encode the credentials values.
A summarized sequence of steps of our credential mining methodology is shown
in Figure 4.2. Assume a victim generated a set of packets of network traffic, y, in
an hour, typically |y| ' 53 Million packets in a 10Mbps bandwidth [47]. Let n be
the number of web applications the victim logged in to during that hour, and x
be the set of the packets generated from all login operations. Let us assume that
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each login operation is sent in one packet, and a typical user does not log in to
more than 100 websites in an hour, that is, |x| = n < 100. In order to acquire
such a small set x from a large set of packets, y, with |x|  |y|, a technical survey
of the login operations in some web applications was conducted. The following
common features were observed, they are used to identify the packets in x with
high accuracy:
• The commonly used protocols for communicating credentials to web applica-
tions are HTTP, HTTP2, and SPDY. (Adopting HTTP2 has been increasing
since October 2015, and adopted by the top web applications: Facebook,
Google, Twitter and others [48])
• The only observed method used to transmit credentials is the ”POST”
method.
• The two observed ”Content-type” headers used for credentials are URL-
encoded form and JSON. (These types of content carry out the credentials
in a structure of parameters (or keys) and their assigned values)
• The target URL of the login requests usually suggest a login page. It includes
a phrase like Login, Logon, SignIn, etc.
Acquiring the packets with the above features is achieved through filtering. A
number of broad Wireshark filters are constructed to retrieve such packets. In a
perfect scenario, the resulting set of packets z should be the same as x which is
not the case most of the time. A packet p ∈ x but p /∈ z means that p is not
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captured by the filters due to different features than the ones mentioned above,
resulting in p considered as false negative. The opposite case, that is, for a packet
p /∈ x but p ∈ z means that the filters captured some possible login operations
which are not, resulting in p counted as false positive. Furthermore, to improve
the identification accuracy of login requests, he parameters names and their values
will be deeply analyzed. From the technical survey it was noticed that most of
the parameters carrying the usernames and passwords are self-descriptive (using
meaningful parameter names). There are few cases where the username and pass-
word parameters were not self-descriptive, especially in web applications that do
not use HTTPS for sending the credentials. Web applications with HTTPS will
rely on encryption to obfuscate the credentials. However, non-HTTPS applica-
tions should use their own encoding to obfuscate credentials.
The identification of true username and password parameters is divided into
two steps, for each packet in z, all its parameters will be first analyzed by its
naming style, then by its value. For the processing of the parameter naming
style, a list was prepared consisting of keywords in which username and passowrd
parameters are carried across. Such list of keywords includes: username key,
uname, email, session user, PWORD, passw , etc. If such parameter is found and
it includes a value, that value is assumed to be either a username or a password
depending on the parameter name. If, on the other hand, the parameter name does
not match any of the above list of keywords, it will be passed to a heuristic engine.
The heuristic engine uses a set H = h1, h2, ..., hr of low-level heuristics to compute
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and assign a pair of scores (unk, pwk) for each parameter k indicating how k is
related to the respective credential (username or password). The scoring heuristic
is explained in Algorithm 1. The algorithm decides whether a given parameter k
is considered as a username, password, or simply ignored. A parameter k with a
score pair satisfying max(unk, pwk, t) = unk, for some fixed threshold value t, is
considered to be a username. On the other hand, if max(unk, pwk, t) = pwk, then
k is considered as a password. If neither score exceeds t, the parameter k will be
ignored.
Algorithm 1 Scoring Heuristic
Input: Parameter k, Heurestic Set H, Thresholds t
Output: decisionk ∈ {username, password, ignore}
unk = 0
pwk = 0
for i = 1 to |H| do
if Match Username(k, hi) then
unk = unk + hi(k)
end if
if Match Password(k, hi) then
pwk = pwk + hi(k)
end if
end for
if max(unk, pwk, t) = unk then
decisionk = username







The heuristic set H in Algorithm 1 is constructed using some results collected
from different sources:
1. a study performed on password enforcement policies in Alexa top 25 web-
sites [49],
2. an experiment on the trends followed in password creation [50],
3. A study performed in this thesis of the 10 million stolen usernames and
passwords data set found in [51].
The above results include the following:
• It is a trend for usernames to be in the form of emails.
• Passwords created with enforced policies have identifiable features related
to the creation policy, such as having combinations of symbols, digits, upper
and lower case letters.
• Out of 10 Million usernames 97.5% have 4-16 characters without including
the domain name in case of emails.
• Out of 10M passwords 94.4% have between 4 and 11 characters.
• 7% of 10M passwords start with a capital letter.
• Passwords might have letters then numbers or vice versa.
• 45.5% of 10M passwords end with digits.
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• 68.1% of 10M passwords and 92.3% of usernames have more alphabetical
than non-alphabetical characters.
• 90% of usernames and 88% of passwords belong to set of patterns. These
patterns are shown in Table 4.1, only the patterns that represent more than
1% are shown. For instance, in the 10 million passwords, a total of 11715
patterns were detected, only 8 of them represent more than 1% of the pass-
words. in total these 8 patterns accumulate 88.70% of all the passwords
patterns.
Table 4.1: Detected usernames and passwords patterns in the 10M data set
To identify the heuristic scores of usernames and passwords, the heuristics
were implemented on the 10 million stolen usernames and passwords data set.
The calculated scores of all the usernames and passwords are shown in Figure 4.3.
The figure shows the ranges of the calculated heuristic scores for the usernames in
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the top and for passwords in the buttom. For instance, 2564495 passwords have
a score between 130.32 and 140.35.
Based on the calculated scores, the ranges to identify usernames and passwords
have been set and are shown in table 4.2. An overlap in the scores ranges between
usernames and passwords can be noticed which will be reflected in the evaluation
section 5.3.3 as a main source for false detection.
Figure 4.3: Calculated heuristic scores for the 10 million usernames and passwords
Table 4.2: Heuristic scores ranges
After detecting either a username or a password parameter, the process of
building the credentials list starts. Each detected username or password is as-
signed to a credential entry in the credential list. Assume that a username pa-
rameter uname is detected with no password for a specific web application w. A
credential entry c is created for w with only a username parameter. Assume that,
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shortly after, a password parameter pword is detected for w. Then pword should
be added to c. The previous case is a typical case for detecting credentials in web
applications that implement two steps login operations, where the username and
the password are entered separately, such as Yahoo and Google.
Another case might happen when a credential entry c exists for a web appli-
cation w with a username parameter uname and a password parameter pword
before detecting the same parameters uname and pword again but with different
values. This would suggest a possible incorrect credentials. For possible forensic
applications of NetInfoMiner, all the detected credentials are saved even if they
might be incorrect, since they can be used as a proof of a login attempt. To verify
whether the detected credentials yielded a successful login or not, two solutions
are presented: (1) monitoring the creation of a session management cookie which
might indicate a successful login operation, and (2) analyzing the HTTP response
for an incorrect login. An incorrect login will result in an HTTP response with
an HTML page including a phrase suggesting a failed login such as ”Incorrect
username or password” or other error messages, or if the login form is displayed
again, since sometimes a failed login does not generate any errors.
4.3 Session Cookies Extraction
Figure 4.4: Session Cookies Engine
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The Third type of information extracted by NetInfoMiner is session cookies.
Web application servers communicate the establishment of a cookie to clients
using the set-cookie header in HTTP responses. Upon successful login, the client
receives a Set-Cookie header from the server with the value of the cookie that
will be later included in every transaction between the client and the server in
the current session. Apart from authentication, Web applications use cookies
for other purposes. Hence, not all set-cookie headers contain a session cookie.
To distinguish a session cookie from other variants, the naming of the newly set
cookies was targeted. Famous web development frameworks can be fingerprinted
using their cookie naming. For instance PHPSESSID is typically used in PHP,
JSESSIONID in J2EE, CFID and CFTOKEN in ColdFusion, etc. [52]. The web
framework usage statistics justify that direction, since the collected session cookie
names covers more than 70% of the mostly used frameworks, for instance PHP
is used in 26% of all websites, several ASP versions around 30%, J2EE with
9%, etc. [53]. A list of known session cookie names was prepared, in addition
to other customized names for the session cookies implemented by some famous
web applications, Facebook for instance applies three cookies to maintain user
sessions, ”datr”, ”c use”, and ”xs” [54]. Any detected cookie which is set in a
time frame close to a detected login attempt to the same host, and it’s name
matches a keyword in the prepared list, that cookie will be assumed as a session
cookie.
NetInfoMiner’s approach for detecting session management cookies as shown
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in Figure 4.4 can be summarized as follows:
• Extract all HTTP responses with Set-Cookie headers.
• Detect a cookie with a name matching the known names of session cookies
(i.e. JSESSIONID).
• Filter out known non-session management cookies (i.e. ga, utma, utmb,
etc.).
• The remaining session cookies are grouped in cookie sets, each set represent
the cookies defined between a client and a server.
• The final step is exporting the detected cookie sets into an XML structure.
A sample extracted cookie sets is shown in Figure 4.9. The values of the
cookies are not shown in this sample for privacy reasons.
4.4 Social Network Information Extraction
The fourth type of information extracted by NetInfoMiner is related to tracking
some users activities on the largest social network, Facebook. The current tracked
activities are, comment, reactions (like, love, etc.), add post, edit post and delete
post. The methods Facebook follow to implement such activities were studied by
capturing the network traffic generated by performing them and analyzing them
using Wireshark. The summarized methodology for the social network mining
engine is shown in figure 4.5. To extract only the packets with interesting activ-
ities, a group of Wireshark filters was constructed, the filtering scheme is based
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on searching for requests with certain keywords, these keywords are the parame-
ters names used by Facebook to implement each activity. Each captured request
contains a large number of parameters needed by Facebook. In the scope of our
work, we are only interested in few of them, such as, the text, the user, the pri-
vacy settings (Only me, Friends, Public, or Custom list),the time, and the activity
type. After extracting the desired information, a time line of the activities will be
constructed.
Figure 4.5: Social Network Mining Engine
4.5 Implementation
NetInfoMiner is currently implemented for Windows, but it can be straightfor-
wardly extended to other OSes. The implementation includes four main engines,
one for each targeted information type. The general implementation approach for
each engine is shown in Figure 4.6.
NetInfoMiner leverage the various capabilities provided by Wireshark [39], in
particular, the command line version tshark. NetInfoMiner receives as input the
network traffic dump file and possibly the TLS key log file (KLF) or RSA private
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key if available. Then, it initiates calls to tshark to extract the desired types of
information by applying a sequence of Wireshark filters. A simplified syntax for
all the applied filters for each mining engine are shown in table 4.3. The real filters
are way too long and complex to present, and sometimes due to different column
naming on Wireshark, some filters were split (i.e a filter for URL-encoded Form
and another for json ). Each filter takes care of keeping only packets needed in
extracting a particular type of information (i.e. HTTP2 headers with Set-cookie
values). The process of building these filters can be generalized as follows:
1. Record network traffic while performing the desired information to be ex-
tracted (login operation, visiting links, etc.)
2. Analyze the captured network traffic by looking for known keywords used
in performing the operation. For instance, in credential extraction, search
for the used credentials in the network traffic. This is used to identify the
requests or responses that are used to carry the desired information
3. After identifying the requests or responses with the desired information, they
are analyzed for common identifiable features, such as the protocol method,
header names, parameter names, etc.
4. The identified features need to be incorporated into a filter to identify similar
requests or responses in other network traffic.
The output of this filtering step is a sequence of strings representing only
desired fields (time, source IP, etc.) from selected packets. In few cases, the
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output of this step needs to be processed further due to some implementation
limitations (e.g. HTTP2 data objects cannot be extracted in ASCII encoding
directly). In this area, we depended heavily on the strong features provided by
the task automation tool from Microsoft PowerShell. Afterwards, the processed
results can be sent to the appropriate mining engine which is implemented in C
language. The final output is collected from all mining engines to build an HTML
formatted report for each victim.
Table 4.3: The Implemented Wireshark Filters for each Mining Engine in a Sim-
plified Syntax
NetInfoMiner is designed with the support of HTTP, HTTP2 and SPDY pro-
tocols. There is a significant difference between the syntax of HTTP protocol in
one hand and both HTTP2 and SPDY on another. For instance, in a single HTTP
POST request, all the headers and data of the same request are close together
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making it easier to extract and process them. However, in HTTP2 and SPDY,
the requests and responses might be multiplexed and the data segment and the
header segment of the same request might be interleaved with other segments
of other requests. This makes the process of extracting the same information
type (e.g. credentials) in HTTP2 and SPDY more complex than in HTTP. So,
the processing performed by NetInfoMiner for HTTP2 and SPDY has a lot of
differences and require further steps not required for HTTP. While the general
approach shown in Figure 4.6 is still the same, but for the same targeted infor-
mation type, totally different filters and output pre-processing are implemented.
The extra processing required for HTTP2 and SPDY includes two parts. First,
the current implementation of Wireshark (Version 2.2.1) does not provide well
organized segmentation of the HTTP2 and SPDY headers as it does for HTTP.
For instance, in HTTP, the user − Agent header can be directly accessed by the
column identifier http.user agent while in HTTP2 and SPDY such identifier does
not exist yet. The second extra processing is for having some required information
type (i.e. credential parameter) in a different packet than the header segment of
the same request, in case they were not transmitted together. This requires Net-
InfoMiner initiating an additional call for tshark to extract the required headers
of a previously processed data segment.
A sample output of a browsing session is shown in Figure 4.7. The description
of the XML fields in the extracted browsing sessions are mentioned below:
• Time: The time stamp of the first visited link included in the current brows-
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Figure 4.6: NetInfoMiner General Engine Implementation
ing session.
• Client: The IP address of the machine the client used to perform the current
browsing session.
• Duration: The time between the first and last detected visited link in the
current browsing session.
• Browser: The application from which the client conducted the current
browsing session.
• visit time: the time stamp of the visit of the link.
• link: the URI of the visited link
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Figure 4.7: Extracted Browsing Session Sample
A sample extracted credential is shown in Figure 4.8. The description of the
XML fields is mentioned below:
• Client: The IP address of the machine the client used to perform the login
attempt.
• Host: The host name of the HTTP server that the client is trying to log
into.
• Browser: The application from which the client used to perform the login
attempt.
• LoginType: the type of the login process whether a Single-Page or Two-Page
login.
• DetectionType: specifies the way the username and password were detected
(Parameter naming or Heuristics).
• LoginTimeUsername: the time stamp when the username was initially sent
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to the server.
• UsernameKey: the parameter name of the username.
• UsernameValue: the actual username string, might be an email.
• LoginTimePassword: the time stamp when the password was sent to the
server. In Single-Page logins, the LoginTimeUsername and the Login-
TimePassword will be exactly the same, since both parameters are sent
together. While in Two-Page logins the timestamps will be different.
• PasswordKey: the parameter name of the password.
• PasswordValue: the actual password string.
• UsageCount: Number of times these credentials were used.
• LoginTime: the time stamp of beginning the login attempt into the above
host with the above username and password. Since there might be several
attempts.
For the cookies, all cookies exchanged between a client and a host will be
represented in a different cookie set. A sample extracted cookie set is shown in
Figure 4.9.
4.6 Extensibility
In this section, the extensibility feature in NetInfoMiner is highlighted. Also,
some implemented features are hard coded in the current implementation but can
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Figure 4.8: Extracted Credential Sample
Figure 4.9: Extracted Cookie Set Sample
be modified to provide extensibility, these features are discussed with the required
modifications to reach that goal. NetInfoMiner was designed with extensibility in
mind, in order to make it a solution that can last longer. The main reasons that
require the extensibility feature to exist is the following:
1. All the mining engines in NetInfoMiner depend on a group of Wireshark
filters to extract raw traffic content with possible existence of desired in-
formation. Modifying these filters has a crucial effect on the accuracy of
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information extraction. So, in the future, if the method to extract a desired
information changes, these filters can be modified easily in text format and
do not require any compilation. For instance, to extract possible login re-
quests for the credential engine, all HTTP POST requests to a page that
includes the phrase ”login” are forwarded for further processing, if in the
future a new common phrase is noticed in login pages, this phrase can be
added to the Wireshark filter that is responsible for extracting the login
requests.
2. The visited links engine depends on a list of known advertisement URLs
used to filter out requests that are automatically generated for advertisement
proposes. The list exist in a separate text file and can be manually edited to
optimize the accuracy of the extraction in case new advertisement requests
have been noticed and require to be filtered out.
3. The credential and session cookie engines depend on a hard coded list of
parameter names (keywords) that most likely hold usernames and passwords
(uname, passwd, etc.) or session cookies (ASPSESSION, PHPSESSION,
etc.). These keywords might change in the future, this would affect the
accuracy dramatically. To make the solution extensible, the code must be






In the process of evaluating NetInfoMiner the following limitations were faced:
1. There is no existing data set that can be used to evaluate the developed
tool. The reasons for that is related to the following:
(a) The tool can analyze encrypted traffic if the session keys were acquired.
In this work, the session keys were acquired using the proposed DESSK
attack, other network traffic encrypted using unavailable session keys
cannot be analyzed using this tool.
(b) To the best of our knowledge, there is no party that is willing to share
network traffic that holds users credentials or that can expose users
privacy.
2. The number of responding test subjects was limited due to the sensitivity
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of the experiment (exposing credentials).
3. Performing comparative evaluation against similar tools is not possible due
to different supported protocols and different extracted data types.
4. The evaluation of the visited links mining engine was limited and performed
manually due to the lack of mechanism to collect the true values of visited
links from test subjects.
5.2 Testing VM and Web Applications List
For the evaluation process, a windows VM was created and distributed among
a group of test subjects. The VM included a prototype of the SSLKeyStealer
malware, upon the launching of the malware the infection process starts, and
the malware schedules a task to periodically transmit both the captured network
traffic generated by the subjects in addition to the created KLF. To collect data
generated by popular websites, we setup a local page including links to the top 500
websites according to Alexa. Each test subject was asked to visit some websites
and create dummy accounts and then log into these accounts.
5.3 NetInfoMiner Tests and Results
After completing the data collection from the test subjects, NetInfoMiner was
used for the information extraction.
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5.3.1 Visited Links Results
The evaluation of the visited links mining engine was done by comparing the re-
sults with the browser history, the results show that NetInfoMiner successfully
identifies all the visited links with few false positives resulted by uncontrolled
redirects as mentioned in the original paper [21]. There is no quantitative mea-
surements for the accuracy of the visited links mining engine due to the lack of
mechanism to acquire them. Nonetheless, NetInfoMiner applies the RCI approach
mentioned in [21] which is claimed to have an accuracy up to 95% of extracting
the visited links. Also, the addition of filtering known advertisement requests
as suggested in [18] claims extracting visited links with false positives between
0.74%-1.16% using the RCI approach. The only addition in NetInfoMiner is the
support of HTTPS. Due to the reasons mentioned above, the accuracy of the
visited links in NetInfoMiner can be assumed to be similar to the the accuracy
mentioned in ClickMiner [18], until proven otherwise.
5.3.2 Credentials and Session Cookies Results
Regarding the evaluation of the credential and session cookie mining engines, each
test subject reported how many websites he logged into. That information is then
used to tell how many of them NetInfoMiner could extract based only on the test
subject’s network traffic.
Figure 5.1 shows the results of the empirical evaluation of the credential engine.
Among 70 communicated credentials, NetInfoMiner could successfully identify 65
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of them, that is 92.86%. We manually analyzed the traffic to understand the
reason NetInfoMiner missed these 5 websites. We noticed no POST requests
generated from these websites neither in HTTP, HTTP2, nor SPDY. We used the
”Network recorder” feature available in most browser developer tools; Pinterest
for instance, after a successful login generated a GET request with only the session
cookie, the credentials was not observed anywhere. Other websites didn’t generate
any HTTP request on the network traffic while login.
Figure 5.1: The web applications used in the evaluation of the credential engine
The results of the session cookie engine as shown in figure 5.2, shows that it
is able to extract the session cookies from 77.14% of the tested web applications.
In the process of evaluating the credential and session cookie engines, many
experiments were conducted that involves capturing login attempts into web ap-
plication, only three of those were documented in details that enabled accurate
measurements. Table 5.1 shows quantitative measurements of the accuracy of the
credential engine when evaluated using three captured network traffic files with
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Figure 5.2: The web applications used in the evaluation of the cookie engine
login attempts to a group of widely famous web applications. The results display
good accuracy in extracting login attempts with overall 6.35% false positive and
9.2% false negative. For instance, the third packet trace file (PCAP) captured
30 login attempts, 5 of them where not extracted by the credential engine and
they are considered as false negatives, and 3 where not credentials and considered
as false positives; they are parameters with names that match the expected pa-
rameter names of usernames and passwords. The overall percentage of the false
positives was calculated for the three files as the ratio of the false positives com-
pared with the total extracted login attempts. On the other hand, the overall
percentage of the false negative was calculated for the three files as the ratio of
the false negatives compared to the total number of actual login attempts.
Table 5.2 shows the quantitative measurements of the accuracy of the cookie
engine for the same captured network traffic used for the evaluation of the cre-
dential engine. The results shows a significant lower accuracy compared to the
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Table 5.1: Quantitative measurements of the accuracy of the credential engine
credential engine, with 40.04% false positive and 30.77% false negative. For in-
stance, pcap file 3, with of 30 login attempts to 30 sites, the session cookie sets
(cookies exchanged between client and server) of 13 sites were not extracted and
considered as false negatives, and 5 extracted cookie sets were considered as false
positives since they are related to known advertisements and content management
web applications (adnxs.com, akamai.com). The overall percentage of the false
positives was calculated for the three files as the ratio of the false positives com-
pared with the total extracted session cookie sets. On the other hand, the overall
percentage of the false negative was calculated for the three files as the ratio of
the false negatives compared to the total number of login attempts. The results of
the cookie engine suggest that it needs further improvements, especially targeting
the elimination of the Ad related cookies which totaled 26.58% of the extracted
session cookies as shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Quantitative measurements of the accuracy of the cookie engine
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5.3.3 Heuristics Engine Evaluation
In this section we provide the results of evaluating the heuristic engine which is
a part of the credential engine. The reason why we had to provide an isolated
evaluation of the heuristic engine is that most detected credentials are detected
using parameter naming rather than heuristics. But, in the future, web applica-
tions may change their naming styles which would render the parameter naming
detection approach insufficient. For that reason the heuristic engine is required to
make NetInfoMiner a solution that could last longer. Unfortunately, there aren’t
much sites that wasn’t detected using parameter naming. So, we resorted to eval-
uating the heuristic engine using the 10 million stolen usernames and passwords
data set [51]. The goal was to evaluate the implemented heuristics and whether
they can identify usernames and passwords correctly. Table 5.3 shows the results
of testing the implemented heuristics and their ability to identify usernames and
passwords. As the table shows, among 10 million passwords 94.8% were correctly
identified as passwords but 67.95% were identified as usernames, this is related
to some similar features between usernames and passwords that the implemented
heuristics aren’t able to correctly distinguish the difference. For instance, the user-
name ”mama1998mama” is also a possible password. Also, among the 10 million
usernames, 91.66% was correctly identified as usernames but 89.86% was identi-
fied as passwords for the same earlier mentioned reason. On the other hand, the
heuristics were tested on parameters that do not include any usernames or pass-
words. Among 6075 parameters, 26.5% were identified as passwords and 25.53%
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were identified as usernames. For instance, the parameter en-US is a password
according the implemented heuristics.
The above noticed results suggest that the heuristic engine still require more
work due to significant amount of false detections. The additional work can be
by either adding more distinctive heuristics or by optimizing the heuristic scores
ranging.
Table 5.3: Results of testing the Heuristic scores on the 10M data set
5.3.4 Social Network Results
For evaluating the extraction of Facebook common activities, the network traffic
of performing the targeted activities were captured individually for several times,
and all of them were extracted successfully.
For further evaluation, the following experiment were conducted:
1. In Firefox browser, the support for HTTP2 was disabled. The fallback
protocol negotiated with Facebook if HTTP2 is not enabled was SPDY.
2. Logged into a Facebook account and performed the following activities:
(a) Like PostID 10157703716340307
(b) Comment ”Hala Madrid!” to postID 10151132821914953
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(c) Love postID 10157692692170307
(d) New Post ”Helloooooooo”
3. Switched to Chrome browser (HTTP2 is enabled by default) and performed
the following activities:
(a) Edit postsID 10157814419505578 to ”Helloooooooo-Edit”
(b) Delete Post 10157814419505578
After capturing the traffic generated from performing the previous activities,
NetInfoMiner was used to extract these activities from then traffic traces. The
results show that, it was able to extract all of the previous activities. But, one of
the activities was missing the user Facebook ID property which was expected to
be extracted. This reflects that Facebook doesn’t always use the same parameters
for communicating the same activity. Nonetheless, there is a solution to recover
that missing property by searching for it in the same recorded TCP stream in
the network traffic. Facebook generates large amount of requests in a single TCP
stream, a missing property in one request might exist in others. We manually
inspected this option and found that the missing user Facebook ID exists in other
requests in the same TCP stream of the recovered activity, and since a single TCP
stream can only contain the activities of a single Facebook user, extracting that
missing element from other requests in the same stream is a valid choice.
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5.3.5 Disable/Enable HTTP2 Experiment
The effect of the negotiation of different protocols by clients and web applications
is mentioned in Section (2.2). To evaluate how NetInfoMiner adopts with such
effect, a quick experiment was conducted. Firefox browser enables the clients to
disable or enable the support for HTTP2 protocol. We visited and logged in to the
twitter website with HTTP2 enabled, then disabled the support for HTTP2 and
re-logged again. We then analyzed the captured traffic of the experiment using
NetInfoMiner. The tool successfully detected both login operations even though
one was carried over HTTP2 while the other was over SPDY.
5.3.6 Ebay Special Case
A special case was observed in the ebay web application that demonstrated the
advantage of the heuristic engine. As seen in figure 5.3, although there are param-
eters with names suggesting the existence of a username (userid) and a password
(pass), the credential engine neglected these two parameters since they are empty.
Instead, the heuristic engine detected both parameters correctly even though their
names only includes numbers. The matching criteria for the username is its email
syntax, and for the password it is its high heuristic score due to matching with
enough number of password features to be assumed as one.
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Figure 5.3: eBay Credential Parameters
5.4 Comparison
Table 5.4 shows a comparison of the capabilities of NetInfoMiner to other existing
tools. NetInfoMiner targeted new types of information not targeted by existing
solutions due to the new option of decrypting HTTPS traffic. As the table shows,
NetInfoMiner is the only tool compared to the others that supports the analysis
of HTTPS traffic. In addition to the support for HTTP2 and SPDY for extracting
credentials, session cookies and Facebook common activities.
There is no need to compare the accuracy of the Visited links engine in Net-
InfoMiner against ClickMiner [18] since it applies the same RCI approach men-
tioned in [21] with the addition support for HTTPS protocol. Regarding Net-
workMiner [19], to the best of our knowledge no measurable accuracy has been
mentioned regarding the visited links extraction.
The credential engine in NetInfoMiner shows acceptable accuracy in extract-
ing credentials carried across multiple protocols, HTTP, HTTPS, HTTP2 and
SPDY. The credentials extraction in NetworkMiner has no mentioned accuracy,
but, by testing it, it has very limited accuracy since it only dumps all HTTP POST
parameters and cookies. Same thing regarding the session cookies, although Net-
InfoMiner ’s session cookie engine didn’t show the expected accuracy in extracting
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session cookies, it still better than NetworkMiner, since the latter only dumps all
cookies in the traffic in a separate tab with no fixation on session cookies.
Table 5.4: Supported features in NetInfoMiner tool compared to others
5.5 Learning Process
In this section we describe the process of improving the accuracy of NetInfoMiner
and the possibility of making the leaning process automatic.
5.5.1 Manual Learning
Throughout the development of NetInfoMiner it was continuously evaluated using
many network traffic captures to evaluate the extraction accuracy and perform im-
provements. The process of manual learning of NetInfoMiner can be summarized
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as follows:
1. Traffic Capture Feeding: each attempt to teach NetInfoMiner starts with
feeding it with a new traffic capture that contains the desired information
to be extracted (Credential, cookies, etc).
2. Result Evaluation: after feeding NetInfoMiner with a traffic capture, the ex-
traction results are manually inspected. NetInfoMiner was programmed to
generate traces for each processing step to help in the learning process, these
traces are manually inspected to figure out the reasons behind inaccurate
results. The most common reasons behind inaccurate results were parsing
issues or missing keyword (in case of credential extraction). Regarding the
parsing issues, it is by far the most common issue behind inaccurate results;
the parsing issues are related to the various techniques in web application
development. For instance, some web applications applies an unconventional
method for transporting the credentials using delimiters that conflict with
delimiters used by NetInfoMiner in the different processing stages. Up to
this point, NetInfoMiner breaks when processing the results for some web
applications, it is minimized, rare, and can be circumvented manually, but
it exits nonetheless. On the other hand, the missing keyword issues is at its
minimum effect at this point due to the collection of adequate amount of
keywords that can identify the desired information with acceptable accuracy.
3. Reprogramming: after identifying the reasons behind inaccurate results, the
code of the related part of NetInfoMiner that is behind the inaccurate result
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is modified to circumvent the issue. In most cases the modification involves
changing a delimiter, adding a new keyword, or modifying Wireshark filter.
5.5.2 Automatic Learning
At this stage, automatic learning for NetInfoMiner is not implemented and is
assumed difficult. But, we provide the requirements for making it possible. In
general, providing a true positive source of information is the main key. For
instance, in the credential engine, if the credential engine was somehow linked
to the browser database for logged credentials to detect the usage of credentials.
Then this information is used as a feedback to NetInfoMiner. Also the browser




6.1 Summary of Findings
In this thesis, we proposed a new client side attack on SSL/TLS called DESSK.
The attack exploits a new feature in some browsers that enables the logging of
SSL/TLS session keys into a key log file (KLF) in plaintext. We implemented a
prototype of a user-privilege malware called SSLKeyStealer which is responsible
for the creation of the KLF and capturing network traffic if needed. The stolen
keys can be later used in a network data mining tool developed by us called Net-
InfoMiner. It is responsible for the extraction of the desired information from
the victim’s network traffic. NetInfoMiner is composed of four data mining en-
gines, the visited links engine, the credential engine, the session cookie engine,
and the social network mining engine. All four engines support extracting infor-
mation from HTTP and HTTPS traffic. In addition to the support for HTTP2
and SPDY in both the credential and cookie engines.
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The visited links engine was not properly evaluated due to missing data set
and source of true positive, but, it is based on an existing approach (RCI) that
claims accuracy of extracting the visited links between 91-95%.
The evaluation of the credential engine shows that it is able to extract creden-
tials from 65 out of 70 tested web applications. Further testing revealed that the
credential engine can generate 6.35% false positives and miss 9.23% false negatives.
These results suggest acceptable accuracy in extracting credentials. The false pos-
itives are related to some parameter names that match possible parameters known
to hold usernames or passwords, while false negatives are related to either parsing
issues or unknown implemented login criteria by some web applications
The cookie engine showed less accuracy compared to the credential engine.
It was able to extract the session cookies from 54 of 70 tested web applications.
Further testing revealed that the cookie engine can generate 43.04% false positives
and miss 30.77% false negatives. These results suggest that more work needs to
be done on the session cookie engine. The false positives are mostly related to
some advertisements sites that creates session cookies to track users browsing
activities. Testing showed that 26.58% of the extracted session cookies are related
to advertisement purposes to some fixed sites such as adnxs.com. Possible solution
can be 1) adding a list of known advertisement sites that can be used to filter
out their cookies, 2) correlating the results of the session cookie engine with the
credential engine, and only extract session cookies of sites that belong to extracted
credentials in the same time frame.
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The social network engine was implemented to extract common Facebook ac-
tivities. It’s testing shows that it can extract all targeted activities even if they
are carried across multiple protocols and browsers. In some cases, some extracted
activities cannot be related to a Facebook user ID due to a missing parameter.
This issue has not been avoided in the current implementation but it might be
overcome by looking for the existence of a Facebook user ID in the same TCP
stream that the activity was extracted from.
At last, we believe that the key logging feature in its current implementation
imposes the risk of exposing users sensitive information. The KLF should not be
in plaintext.
6.2 Contributions
In this thesis we have two contributions:
1. NetInfoMiner: a network data mining tool able to extract different types of
information carried across four different types of protocols, namely HTTP,
HTTPS, HTTP2, and SPDY.
2. DESSK: a client side TLS attack, able to provide full decryption of TLS
secure sessions by enabling the logging of session keys into a file on disk
then stealing that file.
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6.3 Future Work
The proposed NetInfoMiner is a part of an ongoing research. the shortcomings
and possible future work are as follows:
1. Although it supports HTTP2 and SPDY for user credentials, and session
cookies, the priority is to add the support for HTTP2 and SPDY protocols
to the visited links engine
2. The credential and session cookie engines are programmed with hard coded
keywords to identify possible usernames, passwords and cookies. To make
them extensible, the code needs to be modified to look for these keywords
from and external, modifiable look-up table.
3. The testing of the heuristic engine, as a part of the credential engine showed
low accuracy due to insufficient heuristics. Currently, this doesn’t affect
the accuracy of the credential engine since most credentials are extracted
using parameter naming, but, if it happens in the future that the parameter
naming styles changes, improving the heuristic engine becomes a necessity.
4. The session cookie engine showed less accuracy compared to the credential
engine due to the fixation on session cookie naming only. In addition to the
need to filter cookies related to advertisement sites. Also, we intend to add
support for other session management methods like URL rewriting.
5. The concept of user tracking though Facebook social plug-ins (i.e. Like
button) is used to track real-life identities of users [54]. We plan to build on
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this concept the ability of identifying user’s real-life identities from cookies
set by Facebook tracking system.
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